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Operational Isolation of the Enemy in Offensive Urban Operations

by  
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Army.

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**Abstract of**  
**OPERATIONAL ISOLATION OF THE ENEMY**  
**IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS**

The purpose of this paper is to argue that isolating the enemy at the operational level is the most important aspect of successful urban operations; in fact, an attack on an urbanized area should not be executed before the enemy is isolated. The Joint Task Force (JTF) must take five key actions to operationally isolate the enemy: First, the enemy's logistics must be cut off. Next, enemy command, control, communication, and information capabilities must be degraded. Third, friendly forces must control key components of the urban infrastructure. Additionally, friendly forces should isolate the enemy physically and psychologically from non-combatants by fostering a sense of friendly force legitimacy with the local population. Fifth, friendly forces must control all dimensions of the battlespace in an urban environment to complete the isolation of the enemy. The JTF effectively isolates the enemy by coordinating these five actions, which shape the area of operations to create the necessary conditions for tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

To illustrate the importance of isolating the enemy, this paper recounts Russia's experiences in Chechnya from 1994 through current operations. This case is important not only because it is current, but also because the Russian campaign moved from the countryside, an environment that benefited the Russians, to an urban environment, one that favors the Chechens. The Chechens forced the change in environment to mitigate the Russian military's numerical, firepower, and technological superiority, as well as to inflict high casualty rates on the Russian forces.

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“...War should never be thought of as *something autonomous* but always as an *instrument of policy*...Only this approach will allow us to penetrate the problem intelligently. ...This way of looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them.

The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature.”

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

## Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to argue that isolating the enemy at the operational level is the most important aspect of successful urban operations; in fact, an attack on an urbanized area should not be executed before the enemy is isolated. The Joint Task Force (JTF) must take five key actions to operationally isolate the enemy: First, the enemy’s logistics must be cut off. Next, enemy command, control, communication, and information capabilities must be degraded. Third, friendly forces must control key components of the urban infrastructure. Additionally, friendly forces should isolate the enemy physically and psychologically from non-combatants by fostering a sense of friendly force legitimacy with the local population. Fifth, friendly forces must control all dimensions of the battlespace in an urban environment to complete the isolation of the enemy. The JTF effectively isolates the enemy by coordinating these five actions, which shape the area of operations to create the necessary conditions for tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives. The result of isolating the enemy is that the enemy becomes weaker as their critical vulnerabilities and center of gravity are attacked. Additionally, the enemy is isolated from non-combatants when the JTF normalizes the non-combatants’ lives by reducing the casualty rate and maintaining the city’s infrastructure.

To illustrate the importance of isolating the enemy, this paper recounts Russia’s experiences in Chechnya from 1994 through current operations. This case is important not

only because it is current, but also because the Russian campaign moved from the countryside, an environment that benefited the Russians, to an urban environment, one that favors the Chechens. The Chechens forced the change in environment to mitigate the Russian military's numerical, firepower, and technological superiority, as well as to inflict high casualty rates on the Russian forces. In 1994 Grozny's population was almost 449,000, and the city covered approximately 100 square miles.<sup>1</sup> Russia's first brigade that penetrated Grozny suffered the loss of 800 of 1,000 soldiers, 20 of 26 tanks, and 102 of 120 armored vehicles in only three days.<sup>2</sup> A second attack lost 140 of 200 tanks on the first day. After two months and excessive casualties, the Russians controlled Grozny but lost the city again in August 1996 after only two weeks of fighting.<sup>3</sup> Today, the Russian military has over 100,000 soldiers deployed to Chechnya. Russian troops are better-trained; civil affairs and psychological operations are used more effectively; and Russia is making greater use of temporary non-combatant safe areas, but many past mistakes linger.

### **Isolation and Its Importance**

Isolation is defined in FM 101-5-1 as, "a tactical task given to a unit to seal off (both physically and psychologically) an enemy from his sources of support, to deny an enemy freedom of movement, and prevent an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces. An enemy must not be allowed sanctuary within his present position."<sup>4</sup> Although defined as a tactical task, isolation has an operational effect on the enemy and can be accomplished only by an operational level commander. Currently, there is no joint definition of isolation.

Isolating the enemy requires the capabilities of an operational level JTF. Only a JTF commander controls the requisite resources to effectively and efficiently isolate the enemy's command and control, information, and logistical support; the city's key

infrastructure and non-combatants; and an urban area's battlespace. Even with the assets under a JTF commander's control, the commander still needs the support of the National Command Authority (NCA) to accomplish some aspects of operational isolation. Some support requirements discussed in this paper are either outside the JTF commander's control or outside JTF boundaries.

Isolation is critical to the success of urban operations. A study generated by the U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory found that, "Isolating the defense is apparently very effective. The attacker won all four cases in which the defense was totally isolated. Even partial cut-off of the defenders resulted in attackers enjoying a success rate of 80 percent. Conversely, attackers won only 50 percent of the battles in which defenders were not significantly cut off. No single variable appears more consistent than isolation."<sup>5</sup> These statistics are supported by Marine Corps doctrine that observes, "...total isolation does not appear necessary. The key to the attacker's success is in stemming the unimpeded flow of manpower, supplies, and weapons to replace the defender's losses."<sup>6</sup>

### **Urban Operations Cannot Be Avoided**

Despite the prevailing wisdom that conventional forces should avoid fighting in an urban environment, many compelling reasons exist for U.S. armed forces having to conduct urban operations. For example, an enemy force may attempt to mitigate their opponent's numerical and technological superiority by withdrawing from rural to urban areas. In any conflict, such as Panama, or war, such as World War II, U.S. forces will project power overseas and conduct offensive operations. At some point, U.S. forces will conduct urban operations, either during forced entry from the sea or air, or at the end of an operation when U.S. forces have to defeat the enemy in their capital.

The Russian military is conducting urban operations in Chechnya because the Chechen rebels use a tactic of “successive cities.” The rationale for this tactic is that by drawing the Russians into the urban environment, the militants could reduce the advantage the Russians held in firepower while hiding among and recruiting local inhabitants.<sup>7</sup> If U.S. forces allow the enemy to employ this tactic, the enemy will gain a refuge, control the city, and dodge decisive attacks by U.S. forces.<sup>8</sup>

Another reason why U.S. forces may have to fight in an urban environment is that 45 percent of the world’s population live in urban areas.<sup>9</sup> In 2015, the population in 27 cities will exceed 10 million.<sup>10</sup> By 2025, 85 percent of the world’s population will live in urban areas.<sup>11</sup> The tremendous increase in the population of cities will make what is now a difficult operation even more so in the future. In 1950, the population of Seoul was approximately 1.5 million people and that of Manila about 1 million. The population of Seoul increased to 4.4 million by 1970, and today has grown to 12.8 million. Manila’s population experienced even greater growth, increasing to 7.3 million in 1970, and then 18.7 million now. The geographic size of cities has also increased in correlation to the size of the population.<sup>12</sup>

### **Russia’s Urban Operations in Chechnya**

Chechnya was forcibly annexed by Russia in the 19th century; this period included a brutal 25-year struggle by the czarist army to subdue the Chechens. The Chechens unsuccessfully attempted to gain independence during the Russian Civil War in 1917-1920. During World War II, the Chechens again attempted to gain independence by joining the Nazi’s anti-Communist campaign. In retaliation, the Soviet government exiled the Chechens to the Central Asian deserts, where 30 to 40 percent of the Chechens died.<sup>13</sup>

Chechnya then declared independence in November 1991 under a new government led by former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokar Dudayev.

The Russian government is attempting to reestablish its control over Chechnya, fearing that if Chechnya successfully gains independence, Russia will quickly lose control over the rest of the North Caucasus region. Russian leaders allowed Dudayev to remain in power for three years before making serious attempts to remove him. After fruitless and embarrassing coup attempts and clandestine operations, Russian President Yeltsin ordered a deployment of regular Russian forces to Chechnya on 11 December 1994. However, the mission had been poorly planned and prepared. Russian armed forces quickly realized they had underestimated their enemy. The current invasion of Chechnya was prompted after Chechen insurgents invaded Dagestan, and Chechen terrorists killed 300 people in Moscow and Dagestan bombings.<sup>14</sup>

The Chechen's strategy is to exploit the current weakness of the Russian state, the instability of the Caucasus region, and Islamic nationalist fervor to create an independent Muslim state. Chechen leaders realize that Chechnya, by itself, does not have the economic resources for sovereignty. Chechnya needs Dagestan's access to Caspian Sea oil resources, control of key transportation infrastructure, and critical lines of communication to attain official recognition and court foreign investment.<sup>15</sup> The Chechens are weakening the will of the Russian people and military by killing as many Russian soldiers as possible through their tactic of successive cities.

## **Isolate the Enemy from Their Means of Support**

When the enemy is isolated and can no longer receive outside forms of support, several advantages are achieved, the most important of which is that the enemy's ability to resist attack decreases. Isolating the enemy from their support is a way of exploiting a critical vulnerability that becomes a means to the enemy's center of gravity. How far in advance the isolation should begin depends on how much time is required to stop the enemy's supply lines and deplete their stockpiles. At a minimum, the isolation should prevent resupply and reinforcement of the enemy after the attack begins.

Isolation of the enemy should be conducted before friendly forces attack, rather than after, as the Russian experience demonstrates. When the Russians attacked on 1 January 1995, they did not isolate the city until 12 January. When Chechnya and Grozny were isolated, the militants' normal resupply system was disrupted; and they began to experience supply shortages. In this way, the Russians were able to gain some ground.<sup>16</sup>

Cutting off outside sources of financing is another important way to isolate the enemy. Without the funds to buy weapons, ammunition, and supplies, the enemy's ability to fight diminishes quickly. This cut-off can be accomplished by interdicting alliances through political means, and by identifying bank accounts and using information warfare to seize the money. Intelligence required to identify the enemy's external financial sources should be provided to the JTF commander from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or another intelligence organization. When the financial sources are identified, the Department of State or, as appropriate, the Department of Defense, should support the JTF by first using diplomacy to prevent further transfers of money to the enemy. If diplomacy fails in stemming the flow of money, the CIA has the capability to interdict money

transfers between the source and the enemy. This is an area of isolation that requires NCA support to be effective.

Similarly to financial support, material support must also be stopped at the source to isolate the enemy. If a weapons shortage occurs, the enemy will be unable to arm its forces effectively and for a sustained conflict. Further supply shortages, such as ammunition, food, water, radio batteries, and medical materials, will not only reduce the enemy's capability but also undermine the enemy's will to resist.

In addition to stopping the enemy's support at the source, supplies shipped by allies, arms dealers, and through the black market can be interdicted at key entry points into the country and city where the operation is being conducted. A JTF commander may use available forces to establish a maritime exclusion zone and secure ports and waterways using naval resources. The enemy can be isolated further by securing airports and airspace through the use of air and ground forces. Air and ground forces can contribute to preventing the enemy's use of ground transportation by establishing check points and patrolling the borders and routes leading into the urban area, such as points along railroads and trains, trucks, and key highway and road intersections. Any subterranean access into the country and city should also be controlled. Safe passage corridors can be established in each of these areas to allow the country's economy to remain as functional as possible. (Control of these types of areas is discussed subsequently in this paper.)

When the enemy is isolated from their means of support, divisions in the enemy's unity of command and effort degrade the enemy's operations. The Chechen separatist movement has many factions; some factions are committed to the separatist movement, while others are interested only in gaining power or money. As resources dwindle, each faction will increasingly demand weapons, ammunition, and other forms of support,

creating greater competition and infighting among the factions. This animosity among factions will increase if the groups perceive that supplies are being distributed unequally. The enemy's divisiveness may be further aggravated through psychological operations (PSYOPS) as the material resources remain limited.

Attacking forces must also prevent the defenders from receiving reinforcements from external and internal sources. The JTF must use the combined effects of civil affairs, PSYOPS, intelligence, and ground forces to accomplish isolation. These actions allow the JTF to psychologically and physically isolate the population from the enemy. Russian military commanders reported that, "trucks of young Chechen volunteers...arrived to reinforce the illegal formations...under the guise of civilians, arrive in the center of Grozny allegedly to bury killed relatives."<sup>17</sup> While preventing external reinforcement is a matter of physically isolating the enemy, preventing internal reinforcement is a matter of psychologically isolating the enemy from non-combatants. Psychological isolation of the enemy from non-combatants is gained when friendly forces establish greater legitimacy with the local population than the enemy. (Isolation through legitimacy is discussed later in this paper.)

### **Isolating the Enemy's C4I**

Isolating the enemy's command, control, communication, computers, and information (C4I) capability is a critical means of defeating the enemy, allowing the JTF several advantages. First, the enemy's unity of command and effort can be degraded if communications are interrupted. Without effective communications, the enemy does not have the capability to coordinate and synchronize operations. The enemy communication assets that must be degraded are radio, satellite, Internet, telephone, television, and computer networks. Isolating the enemy by defeating their C4I capabilities can be

accomplished by using ground and airborne jamming assets, interrupting satellite communications access, and intercepting communication transmissions. Free-standing communication networks can be destroyed, or the network can be neutralized with information warfare tactics. Internet service must be cut off by suspending telephone service and by employing information warfare techniques.

Second, isolating the enemy's C4I decreases enemy cohesion. The Chechen separatists are especially vulnerable to tactics that undermine their cohesiveness due to the numerous factions that exist in their movement. Chechen leaders cannot control their armed forces or the military leaders.<sup>18</sup> Factions can unify in their efforts against the Russians; however, each faction is committed primarily to its own clan, territory, resources, and power.

Effective use of psychological operations increases a friendly unit's ability to degrade the enemy's will to resist, deceive the enemy, and achieve the element of surprise. Chechen PSYOPS were effective because the Russians did not attempt to isolate the rebels by stopping Chechen communication capabilities.

The Chechens identified C4I as one of Russia's critical vulnerabilities and then exploited that vulnerability. The Russian military did not use electronic warfare assets to cut off President Dудayev's communications when Russian operations began in 1994. Chechen mobile television stations were used to override Russian TV transmissions, allowing Dудayev to deliver messages designed to favorably influence local, Russian, and international opinion of the Chechens. The Internet was also used for command and control, and external and internal personnel, financial, and material support.<sup>19</sup>

The Chechen rebels also used cheap, over-the-counter communication devices, scanners, and ham radio operator systems to overcome the problems of communicating in

the city. Cellular telephones offered better communications than the Russians' frequency modulated (FM) radios, and commercial scanner systems were used to listen to Russian radio conversations.<sup>20</sup> The Russians did not start monitoring the rebels' cellular telephone calls until April 1996.<sup>21</sup>

### **Control Key Infrastructures**

The key infrastructures of a city are electrical power, telephone service, water, health services, ports, airfields, railroads, mass transit, oil refineries, waste removal, television and radio, highways, waterways, government facilities, and major businesses. A city's infrastructure allows the civilian population to live more comfortably and maintain the economy. Controlling the key infrastructures allows friendly forces to increase isolation of the enemy because it gives the friendly forces greater legitimacy. The JTF is responsible for ensuring the key infrastructure continues to provide service under the control of the host nation government, non-combatants, or if appropriate, a non-governmental organization. The JTF may have to temporarily, or permanently, guard a particularly valuable service that is threatened by the enemy. Other services may be protected by using PSYOPS to heighten the value of a particular infrastructure component to the point where its value to the country's civilians would deter the enemy from destroying the object.

The enemy can be not only physically prevented from using interrupted services and resources but also psychologically isolated from the population because the enemy does not provide people with the "normalcy" a legitimate government provides its people. To understand the importance of an infrastructure component, military planners should determine the value of the infrastructure to the non-combatants, the enemy, and the friendly forces. For example, controlling power allows factories to continue production,

thus enabling the non-combatants to maintain their source of income. Since many people may rely on mass transit systems to travel to work, control of this infrastructure is also important.

Control of key infrastructure elements can also reduce logistical demands on the JTF. Controlling ports, airfields, and other entry points into an area of operations isolates the enemy by halting their resupply mechanisms, but equally important is that these facilities can be used to support the JTF's force projection and sustainment. Controlling railroads, trucking, and key intersections also improves a unit's mobility.

The same infrastructure that relieves the friendly unit's logistical demands also increases non-governmental organizations' (NGO) ability to provide support to non-combatants. Although the levels of cooperation and coordination between the military and NGOs vary, the NGOs can provide short-term solutions to improve the lives of non-combatants, which relieves some of the demands on the JTF or a recovering host nation government.

The protection of government buildings by friendly forces has a generally salutary effect on government leaders and local populations in the urban areas.<sup>22</sup> A JTF can support a host government's viability by ensuring the government has adequate facilities. Once the host nation government is viable, it can resume completing tasks undertaken temporarily by the JTF.

### **Isolating the Enemy by Establishing Greater Legitimacy**

A JTF can increase isolation of the enemy by providing and by helping the host nation government provide non-combatants with the normalcy that citizens expect of their government. During different levels of war, normalcy is difficult or impossible to achieve; however, a certain degree of safety and support are generally expected by non-combatants.

Normalizing non-combatant lives also contributes to psychologically isolating the enemy and local population. If friendly forces normalize non-combatants' lives through control of key infrastructures, information, safety, and humanitarian aid, greater legitimacy will convey to the friendly forces than to the enemy. When this legitimacy is established, the local population may be more willing to aid friendly forces.<sup>23</sup>

A JTF can remain sensitive to the needs of non-combatants by establishing a forum, such as a military coordination center, and deploying civil affairs units to determine the support needs of non-combatants and to adjudicate war crimes violations by the enemy and friendly soldiers, and to address other issues. With respect to Chechnya, Russian leaders overlooked the need to communicate with non-combatants. The Russian army did not deploy civil affairs units in Grozny.<sup>24</sup> Russian soldiers committed many unpunished acts of looting and murders of unarmed civilians.<sup>25</sup>

Civilians should be encouraged to move temporarily to JTF-established safe areas, either within part of the city or outside the city to physically isolate the enemy from non-combatants. The civilians could be spurred to evacuate an area by the availability of health services, safety, NGO support, as well as housing and food in the safe area. The Russian military did this with a safe corridor leading from Grozny to refugee centers.<sup>26</sup> Enough time must be planned by the JTF to allow the non-combatants to evacuate an area. The Russians had to change their first deadline because an estimated 10,000 to 50,000 non-combatants remained in Grozny after the deadline.<sup>27</sup> Some were too sick to leave the city, while others were afraid of attacks by the Chechen rebels.<sup>28</sup> The difficulty of processing thousands of refugees at the safe corridor checkpoint also contributed to the need to delay the deadline.

No matter what enticements are offered, many civilians will refuse to leave their familiar surroundings; however, the more non-combatants who are removed from the battlespace, the easier it will be for units to conduct operations without causing further non-combatant deaths. Removing non-combatants requires a significant effort, but so does resolving problems created by large numbers of civilian deaths and the resultant outcry of the international community. The Law of Land Warfare requires that the operational commander make local agreements to remove wounded, sick, infirm, elderly, children, maternity cases, ministers, medical personnel, and medical equipment from the isolated areas. The commander is not, however, required to allow any other inhabitants to evacuate a city.<sup>29</sup>

Trust is another critical factor that helps establish legitimacy with non-combatants. The civilians must trust that the promises of the friendly forces for safe passage, support, and security of their homes will be kept, and that they will be allowed to return to their homes as soon as possible.

To further preclude isolating friendly soldiers from host nation civilians, the soldiers should receive cultural training and be prepared psychologically for the circumstances typically encountered in urban operations. In addition, individual discipline and command presence are indispensable in avoiding combatant and non-combatant disputes.

### **Isolating the Enemy by Controlling All Dimensions of the Battlespace**

The dimensions of battlespace in urban operations are airspace, borders, and surrounding countryside; upper and lower levels created by buildings; and subterranean networks. Isolating an enemy throughout all dimensions requires detailed coordination and

unity of effort. JTF commanders have most of the assets required to isolate the battlespace; however, some actions will require NCA support.

The Russian military failed to isolate the enemy because the Russians lacked unity of effort. The Russians' main effort advanced into Grozny on 1 January 1994, with the understanding that two supporting attacks would also be conducted. Execution of the supporting attacks was falsely reported by unit commanders, which allowed the Chechens to isolate and destroy the Russian main effort. Later attacks give evidence of similarly fragmented effort as planned support from special forces, helicopters, and infantry attached to tank units never materialized.<sup>30</sup>

Airspace is easily controlled by U.S. air forces, but our most effective weapons platforms in the urban environment, helicopter gun ships, are still vulnerable to the enemy's shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles. In Chechnya, the Russians negated the rebels' missile threat by capturing tall buildings and planning ingress and egress routes using the captured buildings for cover.<sup>31</sup> In addition to using tall buildings to inhibit attacks from antiaircraft missiles, a JTF can use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in place of aircraft in areas where there is a significant shoulder-fired anti-aircraft rocket threat. The UAVs offer greater freedom of movement in the air, as well as information that can aid ground forces in controlling the other dimensions of the battlespace. Missiles will also become less of a threat as the enemy's missile supply is used up and cannot be restocked.

The significance of isolating the enemy at country and city borders and surrounding countryside is to prevent the enemy from receiving reinforcements and supplies from external and internal sources. These areas can be controlled through off-limits areas and safe corridors. The off-limits areas will be enforced through air and ground patrols, sensors, observation posts, and reaction forces, on land, sea, and air. Close air support,

artillery, and armor assets would provide units with superior firepower. Using these assets at borders and in the countryside outside the urban area will give friendly units responsive firepower, without causing undue collateral damage.<sup>32</sup>

Employing operational fires on enemy training and logistics bases, possibly located in another country, is yet another way the operational commander can further isolate the enemy. Safe corridors, controlled by checkpoints, should be established to allow non-combatants to maintain the country's economy, while the remaining areas surrounding the city are sealed off. Temporary checkpoints should be established to surprise the enemy and further isolate the enemy by disrupting their supply routes.

Rooftops, upper and lower floors, and streets can also be monitored by restricting the movements of non-combatants, by placing sensors, and by coordinating air and ground patrolling and reaction forces, snipers, and observation posts. Friendly forces can be supplemented by sensors and occupied areas that allow observation of several areas from one position while reaction forces and planned assaults attack the enemy directly.

Subterranean networks include sewers, walking tunnels, and subways. These can be controlled through the a combination of off-limits areas, safe corridors, monitoring sensors, and reaction forces. Entrances and exits that do not require ready access can be sealed, such as sewer manholes. Subways, which are needed for the normal functions of the city, can be controlled through open access or checkpoints. For passages that must remain open, sensors can be used at entrances, key intersections, and exits to detect movement of personnel at unusual times and equipment that may be of military value. The information gained from the sensors can be used to track the movement of enemy supplies to their source and distribution points for later interception, or reaction forces can be deployed for immediate interception of the enemy. This course of action provides several

advantages for the attacking forces. The threat of a baited ambush, such as the Russians often suffered in Grozny, would be reduced. Offensive actions could be better focused on the enemy, instead of searching blindly in terrain oriented actions. Since actions would be enemy oriented, fewer numbers of troops would be needed because the areas would be seized only temporarily while the enemy and equipment were being captured or destroyed. Then the reaction forces would withdraw from the area, removing the enemy's ever-decreasing resources and preventing the enemy from engaging the friendly forces. Friendly forces would be better able to exploit the element of surprise.

## **Conclusion**

Clausewitz tells us that we can usually pick the wars that we will fight, but, due to the reciprocal nature of war, we cannot dictate the nature of the war. An important aspect of the nature of war, which we cannot unilaterally control, is the environment in which the war will be fought. In future conflicts U.S. forces will fight in an urban environment; to believe otherwise is to hide from reality.

This paper discussed the five areas that must be operationally isolated to successfully attack an enemy defending in an urban area: the enemy's logistics and C4I, key infrastructure, legitimacy, and the battlespace. Operational isolation of these areas is interrelated. Complete isolation of the battlespace requires defeating the enemy's logistics and C4I capability, which relies heavily on establishing legitimacy with the population. Legitimacy is established by protecting people and infrastructure, which also requires that the enemy's logistics and C4I are defeated. This degree of operational isolation can only be achieved with the capabilities of a JTF, supported by the NCA diplomacy.

While an attacking force will still need large numbers of personnel, the number of infantry soldiers fighting in an urban environment can be reduced by weakening the

enemy's capability to resist through operational isolation. When intelligence collecting technology is combined with good analysis, and used to focus naval, air, and ground forces employment, the JTF can defeat the enemy with fewer ground forces.

The U.S. armed forces must prepare for the nature of wars that it is most likely to conduct, not the nature of wars it hopes to fight. Although the urban environment does not favor the type of offensive operations that the U.S. armed forces prepare to execute, we must still prepare for urban operations. An intelligent enemy will attempt to mitigate U.S. strengths, and exploit U.S. weaknesses, by fighting U.S. troops in urban areas.

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<sup>1</sup> Timothy L. Thomas. "The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat." Parameters, Summer 1999, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> MCWP 3-35.3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), Department of the Navy, 15 April 1998, p. J-1.

<sup>4</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, Department of the Army, 1998.

<sup>5</sup> R.D. McLaurin, Modern Experience in City Combat, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, March, 1987, p. 32.

<sup>6</sup> MCWP 3-35.3, p. 1-17.

<sup>7</sup> Timothy L. Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat," Parameters, Summer 1999, p. 4.

<sup>8</sup> Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, "Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025," Parameters, Summer 1999, p. 74-86.

<sup>9</sup> MAJ Steven P Goligowski, "Operational Art and Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain." SAMS monograph, School for Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: May 1995, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> JP 3-06 DRAFT, Urban Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 19 October 1999, p. 2-2

<sup>11</sup> MCWP 3-35.3, p. 1-1.

<sup>12</sup> JP 3-06 DRAFT, p.2-2.

<sup>13</sup> MAJ Raymond C. Finch, III. "Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya." Foreign Military Studies Office. 15 December 1999, pp. 2, 4.

[<http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/yrusfail/yrusfail.htm>](http://call.army.mil/call/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/yrusfail/yrusfail.htm)

<sup>14</sup> The New York Times, "Russian Replaces General in Charge of Chechen Troops." The Providence Journal. 23 January 2000, p. A6.

<sup>15</sup> GEN Anatoliy S. Kulikov, "Trouble in the North Caucasus," Military Review, July-August 1999; Foreign Military Studies Office, 15 December 1999, pp. 1-7.  
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<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p.14.

<sup>18</sup> Kulikov, p. 6.

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<sup>21</sup> Lester W. Grau, "Urban Warfare Communications: A Contemporary Russian View," Foreign Military Studies Office, 15 December 1999, p. 7. <<http://call.army.mil/call/fmsopubs/Issues/yrusfail/yrusfail.htm>> and Red Thrust Star, July 1996.

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<sup>32</sup> McLaurin, p. 37.

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